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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE,
AND WORKER RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY:
SOME LESSONS FROM GAME THEORY
Steven H. Kropp*
INTRODUCTION
In 2001 and 2002, as the American stock exchanges imploded, the
public watched a series of companies admit to gross financial impro-
prieties. Corporate scandals at Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing,
and Adelphia forced those companies into Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
prompted criminal charges against company officers, auditors, and
others.1 Congress responded by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
2
The trajectory of executive compensation, however, has remained un-
* J.D.. Boston University; L.L.M., Columbia University. Visiting Professor of Law. Univer-
sity of St. Thomas School of Law. Although this Article has been long in the making, it has
benefited from presentations of an earlier version at the Law Schools at the University of Den-
ver and Stetson University and at an AALS Roundtable Discussion on Corporate Governance.
The author particularly thanks Bill Young, Bill Woodward, Elizabeth Warren, Malcolm Robin-
son, Kevin Hopkins, Jesse Fried, and Tom Folson for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance received from the refer-
ence librarians and several Law Review students at William Mitchell College of Law during a
year-long visit there from 2006-2007.
1. See Stephen Labaton. Crime and Consequences Still Weigh on Corporate World; Four Years
Later, Enron's Shadow Lingers as Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 5, 2006, at C1 (pro-
viding a timeline for each company's bankruptcy proceedings and executive prosecutions).
Other companies. such as Tyco and Disney, had their share prices cut substantially in value, but
avoided bankruptcy. These companies' compensation packages came under fire, however, for
criminal misconduct on the part of Dennis Kozlowski, Tyco's former CEO, and for potential civil
liability in the case of former Disney president Michael Ovitz's $140 million severance package
received following barely one year of employment. Id.; compare In re Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998) (holding that "courts [do not] overrule a board's
decision to approve and later honor a severance package, merely because of its size"). with
Brehm v. Eisner (Disney 11), 746 A.2d 244. 253-54 (Del. 2000) (overruling Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), and its progeny on the narrow but vital issue of the proper scope of
review-the court changed the standard from the more deferential abuse of discretion standard
to the much more searching de novo standard when a derivative suit had been dismissed by the
trial court), and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch.
2003) (noting the recent increase in corporate scandals, the court commented that "corporation
law's theoretical justification for disregarding honest errors simply does not apply to intentional
misconduct or to egregious process failures that implicate the foundational directoral obligation
to act honestly and in good faith to advance corporate interests").
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204. 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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affected, and pay for top executives seemingly climbs ever higher.
The affected employees and investing public, on the other hand, have
obtained little economic relief either from the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley or from subsequent corporate reorganizations, which have ordi-
narily benefited creditors.3
Many finance and pension law scholars have responded to this
breakdown in corporate governance by proposing ERISA reforms.
Several scholars have argued for restricting the percentage of em-
ployee pension dollars that can be invested in employers' stock to, for
example, 10%. 4
This approach has several flaws. First, although such a restriction
would protect employees' pension funds by promoting stock diversifi-
cation-a cardinal principle of finance-it would deny employees the
opportunity to substantially profit if their employer's stock performs
particularly well. Consequently, this limitation would provide em-
ployees with insurance but no upside return. Second, and perhaps
more troubling, such a restriction may well encourage employers to
drop their pension programs altogether. 5 An employer providing
company stock does not pay cash funds; thus, there is no impact on
funds flow, profits, or the corporate balance sheet.6 Additionally, the
employee motivation and loyalty that comes with stock ownership in
the company would be lost. In other words, employers would lose an
important economic incentive.
Instead, this Article recommends amending the Bankruptcy Code
to protect worker pension plans. When a publicly held corporation
files for bankruptcy, its senior management-its CEO, CFO, presi-
3. Labaton, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 533
(2004) ("ERISA's ten percent cap should be extended to defined contribution arrangements
also."); Sharon Reece. Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DuQ. L.
REV. 69, 135, 141 (2002) (suggesting "quick and decisive action" to curb the lack of stock diversi-
fication and evaluating various proposed plans for reform, such as Senator Wellstone's Retire-
ment Security Protection Act of 2002, which would have capped employer stock holdings at 20%
and provided for punitive damages for ERISA violations).
5. Reece, supra note 4, at 140 ("The [U.S. Chamber of Commerce] expressed concern about
over-regulation and restrictions on investment options resulting in fewer employers offering Sec-
tion 401(k) plans, employee stock ownership plans, and other retirement benefits.") (citing hear-
ings with Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao, Fiduciary Responsibility: Labor, Treasury
Reviewing Pension Rules; Enron-Related Legislation Introduced, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No.
29, No. 5. at 297 (Jan. 29, 2002)).
6. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, Executive Compensa-
tion: A Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 40 Bus. LAW. 219, 237-38 (1984) ("No entries are
made in the body of a company's balance sheet upon the issuance of stock options, but entries
are required when the options are exercised and actual shares are issued. When this happens,
the paid-in capital accounts are increased to reflect the option price plus the amount, if any,
expensed for the exercised stock option.").
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dent, and senior vice presidents-should be forced to disgorge all
compensation beyond $330,000 plus the value of annual health insur-
ance for the previous three years. 7 An annual salary of $330,000
places an individual in the top 1% of income in the United States8 and
recognizes that senior executives in our society expect compensation
commensurate with their responsibilities in managing a public com-
pany. Disgorged moneys would include wages, bonuses, stock op-
tions, consulting fees, and all profits from sales of company stock
received in connection with corporate service during a three-year,
"look-back" period. Disgorged moneys recovered would then be ap-
plied to compensate employees for losses to their employee pension
plans. 9 In short, the advantages of this remedy are three-fold. First,
this proposal provides a form of insurance for employee 401(k) pen-
sion plans in the event that the company goes bankrupt, similar to
FDIC insurance of an individual's bank account or ERISA for defined
benefit pension plans.10 Second, this proposal acts as a proxy for re-
7. This proposed bright-line rule, like any such rule, has several advantages. It is easy to
understand and apply and is difficult to circumvent. The basic criticism of any bright-line rule,
however, is that it does not allow for particularized circumstances. Under this proposal, a CEO
of a bankrupt company could not successfully assert that he did not contribute to the corpora-
tion's demise if instead the company failed because of changes in technology, market forces,
public tastes, or attitudes. Even if true, this is fair. A contemporary CEO is so well paid, pre-
cisely because she is expected to function in a rapidly changing, unpredictable business climate.
Moreover, tying pay to performance invariably means that, just as unmerited success is some-
times rewarded, so too unmerited failure must sometimes be penalized. Part of the difficulty lies
with the current system that protects CEOs as risk takers under the business judgment rule in
cases of corporate failure but compensates them as though they are risk-averse individuals. The
appropriate model is illustrated by the decision of a handful of CEOs to accept a token salary
but substantial stock options for running a company. Lee lacocca, as CEO of a troubled
Chrysler Corporation, did so in 1980. This effectively tied his economic future to his ability to
grow the company's financial future. It worked, and his stock options made him wealthy.
8. An individual in the top 1% of the AGI income bracket earned an annual salary of
$330,000 [$328,049] in 2004. I.R.S., Statistics of Income Division (Sept. 2006), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04inO5tr.xls. The same individual in the top 1% earned $300,000
[$295,495] in 2003. Id. This represents a 10% rise in income over a one-year period. Board
members would be required to disgorge all compensation received beyond $5,000 annually.
9. This proposal arguably changes the structure of economic recovery under § 510(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Currently, principles of equitable subordination dictate that a shareholder's
recovery for damages for the purchase or sale of the corporation's stock be subordinated to all
claims held by creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (Supp. 2007).
10. In a defined benefit pension plan, the company guarantees the amount of an employee's
pension benefits based on her retirement age, salary, and length of service with the company.
Accordingly, because the company guarantees the benefit schedule, it therefore bears the risk of
downturns in the financial markets. For example, in 2003, General Motors was forced to sell
bonds in order to shore up its ailing pension program. See Danny Hakim with Jonathan Fuer-
bringer, G.M. to Raise $10 Billion For Pension Gap, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at Cl. Moreover,
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, created as part of the 1974 enactment of ERISA,
provides additional insurance in the event of a corporate default on pension benefits. By con-
trast, in defined contribution pension plans, such as 401(k) plans, companies contribute a fixed
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couping excessive executive compensation when bankruptcy occurs.
Third, this proposal respects employees' free choice and enables them
to share in their company's rising economic future as reflected in its
stock gains.
This proposal is rooted in the idea that senior executives and mem-
bers of the board of directors should bear personal financial responsi-
bility for corporate failures. The concept of personal accountability
received recognition in the wake of the WorldCom collapse and sub-
sequent bankruptcy. The telecom giant found itself in financial hot
water when Wall Street discovered that WorldCom had been using
fraudulent accounting methods to mask its deteriorating condition by
painting a false picture of growth and profitability between 1999 and
2002.11 After WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a group of
former employees filed a class action suit in federal court, seeking full
severance payments and benefits. On March 18, 2005, the parties
reached a settlement agreement, whereby all class action claims were
dropped against twelve former WorldCom directors in exchange for a
combined payment of $24.75 million out of the directors' own
pockets. 12
amount of money to employees' retirement accounts, and hence, these plans contain no guaran-
tees of return upon any individual's retirement. The risk of market downturns is borne entirely
by individual workers. Of course, executives are best able to assess the company's prospects for
the future. The proposals advocated in this Article are directed primarily toward publicly held
companies that fund their employees' 401(k) pension plans with company stock rather than with
cash. See, e.g.. Jim Webb, Editorial, Class Struggle: American Workers Have a Chance to Be
Heard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2006, at A18.
11. J. Gregory Sidak. The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse
of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 238-39 (2003);
see also Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent Directors Po-
licing Public Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC's New Rules Governing Public Com-
pany Audit Committees. 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, 677 (2004) (describing the
magnitude of the fraud).
12. See Stipulation of Settlement. In re WorldCom. Inc. Sec. Litig.. No. 02-Civ.-3288(DLC),
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://www.worldcomlitigation.comlhtmllcitisettlement.
html. Judge Denise Cote had previously rejected a settlement agreement, because it was too
small and because it violated the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See In re
WorldCom. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 354 F. Supp. 2d 455. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing the PSLRA
violation): In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.. No. 02-Civ.-3288(DLC), 2005 WL 335201, at *1-6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (setting forth the terms of the original settlement agreement and the
events that led up to the litigation). Cf. Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng, Check, Please: Companies
Discover It's Hard to Reclaim Pay From Executives. WALL ST. J., Nov. 20. 2006. at Al (discussing
the common corporate practice known as "clawbacks," whereby CEOs who receive bonuses
based on performance are typically never required to return bonus money if and when the com-
pany restates its numbers such that the bonuses were never earned).
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This type of settlement is the exception rather than the rule. 13 Con-
servative political commentators commonly demand personal respon-
sibility. Rarely, however, do those expectations reach the corporate
hierarchy.14
The purpose of the American corporation is to maximize share-
holder wealth. 15 The theory of the corporation is that stockholders
own the company, top-level management runs the company, and the
board of directors oversees management for the benefit of the own-
ers.' 6 Executive compensation is designed to reflect corporate per-
formance. 17 During the last two decades, however, executive
compensation has increased dramatically, often without bearing any
relationship to the company's performance. 18
When a corporation files for bankruptcy, corporate performance
does not warrant generous compensation for top executives. Thus, in
light of bankruptcy, excessive compensation should be recovered. Re-
covered funds should be available to compensate employees for losses
in their pension plans. Any excess money should then be applied to
compensate other stockholders or creditors that have securities viola-
tions claims.
13. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (analyz-
ing when outside directors personally pay legal expenses or damages for corporate misconduct
and concluding that it rarely happens).
14. See Ellen Byers, Corporations, Contracts, and the Misguiding Contradictions of Conserva-
tism, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 921, 997 (2004) ("Frequently citing personal accountability as a
core value for the responsible citizen, conservatives fight measures that would ensure it in busi-
ness and politics.").
15. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994) ("[A] corporation . .. should have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.").
See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065, 2072-74 (2001) ("The prevailing academic and business view in the
United States is that shareholder wealth maximization fits with [our] utilitarian, greatest-good-
for-the-greatest-number philosophy."); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term share-
holder value.").
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE. JR.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108-10 (9th ed.
2004).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2000); I.R.C. § 162(m)(1), (m)(4)(C) (2000) ("Certain excessive em-
ployee remuneration . . . no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable em-
ployee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such
remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000." unless
certain performance based goals apply); see also I.R.C. § 280G (2000) (Golden Parachute
Payments).
18. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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This proposal is designed to compensate workers when their corpo-
rate employer files for bankruptcy. Employees risk both job loss and
the destruction of their retirement funds. 19 Bankruptcy is an appro-
priate triggering event, because corporations in bankruptcy typically
lay off a substantial number of workers. With this safety net, workers
are less likely to face the prospect of both loss of employment and loss
of retirement savings.
In contrast, senior managers are often privy to key information and,
thus, know when to leave the corporation's employment, when to ex-
ercise severance pay rights, and when to collect upon stock options
and bonuses. They can also ensure future employment with another
organization. Moreover, when a company files to reorganize under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, incumbent management often
remains in place as the reorganization proceeds. Indeed, incumbent
management, acting on behalf of the debtor-in-possession ("DIP"),
often seeks retention bonuses for itself on the theory that key manag-
ers need added incentives to stay with a financially troubled company
facing an uncertain future. 20
This dichotomy between the treatment of ordinary workers and that
of senior managers strongly suggests the need for reform. In the past
few decades, the gulf in compensation between senior managers and
ordinary workers rose from a ratio of 42 to 1 in 1980 to a ratio of 531
to 1 in 2000.21 The goal of this plan is to align management's interests
with that of the corporation so that all employees do well (or poorly)
together.22
19. E.g., Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We Should, But
Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 855, 856-59 (2002) ("[A]n em-
ployee's investment capital and human capital should not be tied together.").
20. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2007) (Sections 503(c)(1)-(2) were added to
the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 [BAPCPA], curbing abuses plaguing key employee retention bonuses (KERBs) and
excessive managerial severance packages), with 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000), which previously gov-
erned (business judgment rule applies to trustee's power to assume or reject executory con-
tracts); see In re Dana Corp., 351 B.R. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that payment to executives
still employed in Chapter 11 had to be viewed as retention payment).
21. RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 201 (2002). See also id. at
266 n.20 (noting the declining share of earnings for the middle class); William S. Lerach, Plun-
dering America: How American Investors Got Taken For Trillions by Corporate Insiders-The
Rise of The New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 69 (2002). Between 1990 and
2001, CEO pay increased by 535%, making it 531 times that of the average employee. During
this same period, share prices rose by 300% while corporate profits rose by 116%. Id. at 96 n.77.
22. Compare ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 309-13 (rev. ed. 1968), and ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT
PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959) (describing the
consequences of separating the ownership and management functions), with Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (arguing
[Vol. 57:1
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This Article proposes solutions to two distinct but related societal
problems: (1) how to align the interests of corporate management
with those of the shareholders; and (2) how to reduce the economic
unfairness that befalls workers when their companies go bankrupt,
often leaving their 401(k) pension plans worthless. The first goal has
eluded our society despite persistent attention. The second goal, legal
reform, often suffers from doubts that the proposed reform stands a
realistic chance to influence the direction of the law.
Parts II and III sketch the basic outline of the public corporation.
Specifically, Part II examines the principal-agency conflict in the pub-
lic corporation, 23 and Part III briefly looks at the "nexus of contracts"
theory of the corporation.2 4 Part IV reviews the debate over senior
executive compensation and concludes that there is no relationship
between executive compensation and corporate performance. 25 Next,
in Part V, this Article applies the Prisoner's Dilemma from game the-
ory to executive compensation and corporate performance, incorpo-
rating the proposals advocated in this Introduction. 26 The game
theory paradigm demonstrates that a severe sanction imposed upon
senior management can alter managerial behavior and reduce incen-
tives to manipulate stock performance. Part VI draws a distinction
between solvent and insolvent corporations that justifies differential
treatment of executive compensation.2 7 Part VII explains why two
core bankruptcy concepts, fraudulent conveyance law and preference
law, support the ideas advanced in this Article. 28 Part VIII examines
recent reform proposals introduced in Congress but never enacted.29
Finally, this Article concludes that the political environment is ripe for
legislative reform to protect workers' pensions when corporations file
for bankruptcy. 30
that a successful corporation need not align the financial interests of the ownership [shareholder]
and control [management] elements), and Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (2002) (arguing
that executives have substantial power to influence their own pay, which can lead to inefficient
pay arrangements that provide sub-optimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value).
23. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 105-193 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
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II. THE MANAGEMENT-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP
FROM CONTROL IN THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
Shareholders depend on managers and directors to perform their
roles with competence and integrity. 3' Unfortunately, managers and
directors often fail to fulfill these obligations. This basic issue arises
because of the separation of ownership from control in the publicly
held corporation. Corporate accountability requires that the share-
holders (or some institution) monitor management's behavior. 32 A
typical publicly held corporation has thousands of shareholders, none
of whom hold a stake large enough to justify investing their energy in
overseeing the management's behavior. 33 In theory, shareholders can
rely upon an independent board of directors to perform that task.
34
The board of directors, however, is not selected by the shareholders,
but rather by management. 35
31. This principle is represented in corporate law as the business judgment rule: the "pre-
sumption that directors act in good faith, on an informed basis, honestly believing that their
action is in the best interests of the company." In re Tower Air, Inc.. 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.
2005).
32. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance:
The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance. 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 356. 361-66 (2004).
Sufficient shareholder control is necessary in order to overcome managerial inefficien-
cies, and important to address other objectives of corporate governance. Thus. a suc-
cessful corporate governance system will seek to facilitate sufficient shareholder
control, and a successful review of an already existing corporate governance system will
focus on whether or not that system exhibits sufficient shareholder control.
Id. at 364.
33. See Bernhard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 527
(1990) (discussing shareholder passivity and collective action theory: "shareholders won't make
economically motivated proposals or actively oppose manager proposals unless the potential
gains are much larger than the cost of the effort."): Bernhard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice. 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 821 (1992) ("[A] shareholder
proponent bears most of the cost of a proxy campaign, but receives only a pro rata share of the
gains from success, while other shareholders can free ride on her efforts."); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLuM. L. REV.
1277, 1328 (1991) ("[T]wo factors-the inability to take large positions and an active trading
style-explain why [institutional investors] will show only a limited interest in corporate govern-
ance issues, except possibly those related to takeovers.").
34. See Edward S. Adams. Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Compar-
ative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723. 728-29 (2003) (showing a de-
cline in director/management independence throughout the 1900s, though noting that the
increased presence of institutional investors as major shareholders "is causing an evolution in
corporate governance, where the board of directors is truly an independent oversight entity that
can effectively monitor management").
35. Id. at 729-30 (discussing generally the history of management selection of directors, and
the increasing problem of "inside" directors and non-independent boards).
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Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means's enduring classic, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, observed that the large, publicly
held corporation had separated ownership of the corporation-held
by shareholders-from control of the corporation-held by senior
management. 36 Shareholders do not possess the conventional bundle
of owner's rights. 37 Rather, managers control how the property is
used. 38 Modern corporation theorists have characterized this conflict
as an agency problem: the need to persuade the agent (managers) to
maximize the principals' (shareholders') welfare in the corporation. 39
In other words, top management has a strong incentive to cheat in
order to maximize personal wealth at the expense of the shareholders.
Thus, there are two related issues: the cost to the principal of moni-
toring the agent's behavior and the need for the principal to create a
compensation system that provides appropriate incentives to the
agent to maximize the corporation's success, aligning the interests of
management with the interests of shareholders.
III. THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS APPROACH IN CORPORATE LAW
So far, this Article has treated shareholders as the owners of the
corporation. During the past two decades, however, the emerging
trend in corporate legal theory is to view the corporation as a series of
contractual relationships among shareholders, management, workers,
and creditors. 40 Under this nexus of contracts approach, or con-
tractarian model, shareholders are regarded not as owners but rather
as suppliers of a particular form of capital: equity.41 Accordingly,
shareholders are akin to creditors. Instead of a system of shareholder
primacy, this model reflects a system of director primacy. 42 The con-
36. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 22, at 112-16.
37. See id. at 47-65.
38. See id. at 66-84.
39. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP.
L. 737, 755-56 (2001) (arguing that separation of ownership and control creates agency costs that
are sub-optimally high and cannot be solved by market forces); see also William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415-17
(1989) (tracing the origins of agency theory) [hereinafter Nexus of Contracts]. See also Eric W.
Orts, Shirking and Sharking, A Legal Theory of the Firm. 16 YALE L. & POL. REV. 265, 327-29
(1998) (arguing that the traditional agency conception is too narrow-as a legal model centered
around authority, power, and hierarchy, principal costs must be accounted for in addition to
agency costs).
40. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 47 (2002).
41. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts. 88 IOWA L. REV. 1,
9 (2002).
42. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, at 29; Bainbridge, supra note 41, at 8 (proposing a "director
primacy" model: "[T]he board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders . . . but
rather is a sui generis body-a sort of Platonic guardian-serving as the nexus for the various
2007]
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tractarian model focuses on the hypothetical ex ante bargains that
parties would strike if they negotiated formal terms. 43 Default rules,
such as statutes governing corporate law and judicial opinions inter-
preting those statutes, substitute for this private bargaining where it
does not occur.44
If shareholders sat down with managers in advance of investing-
supplying capital-to negotiate the standards by which managers
would be compensated, it is difficult to conceive of the shareholders
agreeing that there would be no standards at all. Rather, both parties
would certainly agree that the corporation's performance and the
manager's contribution to that performance would be the basis for
compensation beyond a base salary. The board of directors would
probably be left with the difficult task of performance measurement.
There would also be standards of performance expected from mem-
bers of the board of directors to ensure proper monitoring of corpo-
rate executives. Thus, the nexus of contracts approach is quite
different from the traditional shareholder-owner theory.
IV. Is EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXCESSIVE?
The need to align the interests of managers with shareholders re-
mains the central conceptual problem in corporate law. Executive
compensation crystallizes the dichotomy between managers and
shareholders, because it clearly splits the interests of the two. But
whether executive compensation is excessive depends in part on what
measuring stick one uses.
There is an extensive body of literature addressing executive com-
pensation. For example, a substantial number of scholars have criti-
cized executive compensation as excessive. 45  On the other hand,
contracts making up the corporation."). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395-1404 (1989). But see William
W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post- Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
180, 193-97 (1992) (rejecting the nexus of contracts theory and arguing that "[plowerful theoreti-
cal foundations and ideological correctness are exciting and gratifying, but academic corporate
law leans more to power talk than to theory talk"); Bratton, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 39, at
418-19 (challenging the basic assumptions-contract, rationality, desire to maximize profits,
competition, and survival of the fittest-upon which nexus of contract theory rests).
43. Bainbridge, supra note 41, at 26 ("Although agents ex post have strong incentives to shirk,
ex ante they have equally strong incentives to agree to a corporate contract containing terms
designed to prevent shirking.").
44. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2006) (unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation, actions based on the written consent of a majority of shareholders are permitted
in lieu of a vote at the annual meeting).
45. See, e.g., Meredith M. Stead, How Incentive Pay for Executives Isn't-And What We Can
Do About It, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 722, 724 (2005) (relating that both non-equity based compensa-
tion and equity based compensation in its current form are excessive and fail to effectively tie
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there is no shortage of articles defending the existing levels of execu-
tive compensation. 46 Defenders of high CEO compensation often
compare executive salaries with those commanded by major league
athletes and Hollywood entertainers. 47 For example, in 1983 pop star
Michael Jackson, then twenty-five, earned approximately $50 million
from his "Thriller" album, while Philip Caldwell, CEO of Ford, earned
only $7.3 million.48 Critics of the high level of executive compensa-
tion, however, look at the distribution of wealth and income in the
United States and note the vast disparity between the average CEO's
pay and that of the average worker.49
An employee's value is tested partly by the market and the scarcity
of that employee's skills, but ultimately by the contributions that the
employee makes to the corporation. 50 This can be observed firsthand
performance to compensation); John E. Core et al., Bebchuk & Fried: Pay Without Performance:
The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1183 (2005) (argu-
ing that "it may be useful to impose additional restrictions on executive portfolios" and ques-
tioning whether additional incentives are necessary). See also Michael B. Dorff, The Group
Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2026-27 (2007);
DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND
How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95-114 (1993) (arguing that CEOs are overpaid); Charles M.
Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 271 (1999) (noting the tendency for overgenerosity in executive pay).
46. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's a Problem, What's the
Remedy? The Case for "Compensation Discussion and Analysis," 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 702 (2005)
(recommending mechanisms to strengthen director independence and disfavoring expansion of
shareholder powers, rather than limiting executive compensation packages); Mark J. Loewen-
stein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50
SMU L. REV. 201, 221 (1996) (expressing a reasonable doubt that the free market has failed to
properly set executive compensation levels and that "the case for additional and significant legis-
lative, administrative, or judicial intervention is not compelling"); Kevin J. Murphy, Top Execu-
tives are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. Bus. REV. 125, 131 (Mar.-Apr. 1986) (citing
special interest groups as furthering their own agendas by confusing the public and creating
controversy over pay levels that are actually designed to encourage executives to act on behalf of
the shareholder); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much
You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV. 138, 138, 141 (May-June 1990) (contending that most
executives do not receive excessive salaries and that meaningful bonuses or penalties should be
given for outstanding or poor performance).
47. John A. Byrne, Worth His Weight, FORBES, June 4, 1984, at 96 (comparing favorably the
salaries of N.Y. Mets outfielder George Foster to Union Pacific CEO William Cook, among
others).
48. Id. Caldwell was the highest paid CEO in 1983 despite the fact that Ford was recovering
from a slump. Id. CEOs themselves often pointed to the high salaries earned by sports and
entertainment figures to justify their own excessive salaries. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH
OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 31, 34-38, 47 (1991).
49. See Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, sec. 6 at 62; Brian R. Cheffins &
Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 233, 237 (2004).
50. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democ-
racy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 81 (1993) (suggesting that executive "[c]ompensation is excessive
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in professional sports and entertainment. Professional athletes are
paid based on their potential and their realization of that potential.
Similarly, in Hollywood, a music star is paid based on her ability to
persuade the public to attend her concerts and buy her music. A
screen actor is paid based on the popularity of her movies or televi-
sion programs. In each of these highly paid endeavors, the employee
sits on one side of the negotiating table, and the employer sits on the
other.51 The employer has a strong incentive to pay no more than is
appropriate, as the salary comes out of the bottom line.52 Conversely,
the employee has a strong incentive to maximize her pay.
Comparisons to these industries are frequently used to justify high
pay in the corporate world. 53 But there is a key difference: the board
of directors, entrusted with protecting corporate interests, does not sit
on the opposite side of the negotiating table from management.
Rather, the CEO invariably selects the board members. The board
typically delegates its responsibility to its compensation committee.
In turn, that committee frequently employs an advisory executive
compensation firm. These actors attempt to approximate the genuine
negotiations that occur elsewhere. 54 The reality is, however, that no
whenever it is higher than necessary to (1) hire or retain the executive, (2) provide the optimum
incentive to the executive, or (3) be fair").
51. Compare Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Com-
pensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long- Term
Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1027-31 (2004) (recommending the strengthening of
board autonomy in the executive compensation decision-making process and the removal of
statutory and regulatory requirements that "pervert" the executive compensation decision mak-
ing process), with Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. REV. 937. 996 (1993) (recommending stronger board oversight and monitoring, based on
a self-motivational model: "each director must function as his or her own motivational force.").
52. An analogous situation occurs when pay-scale is based on seniority. Employers systemati-
cally replace older workers with younger workers who cost the company less money to employ.
See Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and Sexual Harass-
ment, 19 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 421, 421-25 (1999) (refuting the traditional economic justifica-
tion for terminating older employees in favor of newer ones); Steven Kropp, Collective
Bargaining in Bankruptcy: Toward an Analytical Framework for Section 1113, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
697, 716-18 (1993) (contending that, in the context of layoffs in bankruptcy, corporations should
not be allowed to deviate from their seniority structure).
53. See CRYSTAL, supra note 48, at 32-38.
54. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2004).
Nominally, the board of directors of a corporation has ultimate responsibility for deter-
mining the compensation of its key executives. A majority of the board may, however,
broadly delegate its authority to one or more committees .... Public companies com-
monly establish a compensation committee and delegate to it the responsibility for
overseeing the compensation of executive officers. Although the precise responsibili-
ties of any given compensation committee depend on the board's specific delegation of
authority, typical responsibilities of a compensation committee involve: (1) recom-
mending compensation programs and pay levels for the CEO and other top executives;
(2) approving employment agreements and other contracts with such executives: and
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board is going to contend that its CEO is mediocre. The pool of
CEOs will always be like Garrison Keillor's "Lake Wobegon," in
which "everyone is above average,"5 5 further pushing executive com-
pensation ever higher.
As epitomized in Oliver Stone's Wall Street, the first wave of execu-
tive compensation scandals broke in the 1980s. 56 Subsequently, Con-
gress sought to tie executive compensation to corporate
performance. 57 Federal income tax laws were changed to require that
executive compensation exceeding $1 million annually be perform-
ance based in order for companies to receive a tax deduction.58 The
IRS planned to review executive compensation to determine compli-
ance. 59 These changes in the tax laws, however, did not produce the
intended effect. 60 Instead, during the 1990s, the pace of executive
compensation continued to escalate. Proponents explained this phe-
nomenon by referencing the substantial growth in the stock market
indices. Executive compensation embraced not only an increasingly
high base salary, but also included generous stock options, bonuses,
(3) administering equity-based and other long-term incentive compensation plans, in-
cluding making individual equity grants.
Id. at 841-42.
55. A Prairie Home Companion (American Public Media).
56. WALL STREET (American Films 1987).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 162, I.R.C. § 162(m)(1), (m)(4)(C) (Supp. 2007) ("Certain excessive employee
remuneration ...no deduction shall be allowed under the chapter for applicable employee
remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remu-
neration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000," unless certain
performance based goals apply); see also I.R.C. § 280G (Golden Parachutes).
58. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)(Supp. 2007).
59. See 2 BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6, at 136 (Feb. 6, 2004).
60. Christopher Cox, head of the SEC, criticized the $1 million tax deduction cap for top
executive salaries that Congress passed in 1993 in his remarks before the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. He
told the committee that the cap forced companies that needed or wanted to pay their top execu-
tives more to often turn to stock options, which are always tax deductible if paid at-the-money.
These option grants, in turn, led unethical companies and executives to the illegal practice of
backdating in order to maximize their value. See infra note 64 (discussion of stock options and
backdating).
[O]ne of the most significant reasons that non-salary forms of compensation have bal-
looned since the early 1990s is the $1 million legislative cap on salaries for certain top
public company executives that was added to the Internal Revenue Code .... [T]he
stated purpose was to control the rate of growth in CEO pay. With complete hindsight,
we can now all agree that this purpose was not achieved. Indeed, this tax law change
deserves pride of place in the Museum of Unintended Consequences.
Testimony of Christopher Cox, 2006 WLNR 15498300 (Sept. 6, 2006) (also discussing new SEC
rules that will require "the full disclosure of all aspects of executive and director pay and
benefits").
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and pension plans, as well as many esoteric benefits. 6 1 As the sheer
size of executive pay exploded in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars in-
creasingly wondered what, if any, causal relationship existed between
executive compensation, corporate performance, and the stock
market.62
Until recently, scholars have focused little attention on the critical
issue of whether there is a relationship between corporate perform-
ance and executive compensation. Business leaders and economists
reassured the investing public that the market for CEOs was, like
other labor markets, governed by the forces of supply and demand
and, thus, the product of arm's length negotiations between employ-
ees-here, CEOs-and employers-here, corporations represented
by the board of directors.
As scholars investigated various aspects of executive compensation,
they found holes in this neo-classical economic model. Studies deter-
mined that various factors made boards more or less responsive to
CEO performance. 63 In a series of articles, Professors Lucian Arye
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried analyzed the relationship between execu-
tive compensation and corporate performance. 64 They found that
CEOs and compensation committees camouflaged the true costs of
executive compensation to mask the rent-seeking behavior in which
CEOs engaged. After examining previous empirical work on execu-
tive compensation, Bebchuk and Fried concluded that there was no
relationship between corporate performance and the compensation
awarded to high-level executives, because managers used their influ-
ence to decouple pay from performance. 65 Bebchuk and Fried con-
tended, however, that one key restraint upon excessive compensation
61. See David I. Walker, The Manager's Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 640-55 (2005).
Professor Walker discusses these various benefits (stock options, deal bonuses, corporate air-
craft, executive loans, and insider trading) in detail through empirical evidence. He concludes
that increased regulation and monitoring of these channels of compensation is necessary for
institutional investors and shareholders to properly exercise their board oversight functions. Id.
at 655-61. For an example of these esoteric benefits, see Rakesh Khurana, Good Charisma, Bad
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A27.
62. See infra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
63. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 31-34 (2004) (citing various studies).
64. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 846 (2002) (concluding that executive compen-
sation is not generally the product of arm's length bargaining, but is the result of a process that
executives can substantially influence); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Com-
pensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSp. 71, 89 (2003) (arguing that managerial
power and rent extraction are likely to have an important influence on the design of executive
compensation arrangements).
65. Bebchuk et al., supra note 64, at 846.
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was shareholder and popular outrage, which they termed the "outrage
constraint. '66 They asserted that corporations hide the true extent of
senior executives' compensation in order to minimize such share-
holder outrage. 67
This Article takes Bebchuk and Fried's insights one step further in
the corporate bankruptcy setting. In theory, if Company X pays its
top management at an excessive rate unrelated to corporate perform-
ance, then mutual funds, public and private pension funds, and indi-
vidual shareholders can vote against management and the board of
directors at the annual meeting. Alternatively, shareholders can
"dump" the stock outright. Thus, companies that link executive com-
pensation to corporate performance will be valued accordingly. When
a company files for bankruptcy, however, this does not hold true. In
bankruptcy, shareholders, as a class, are typically wiped out; their
stock is delisted and made worthless. Moreover, if the company is in
bankruptcy, its executives must be held responsible for the corpora-
tion's poor performance. Finally, an outrage constraint is of little
monetary value to shareholders once a company files for Chapter 11.
V. LESSONS FROM GAME THEORY APPLIED TO
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
For the reasons outlined above, analysis of executive compensation
should focus on aligning the economic interests of management with
the economic interests of the corporation's shareholders. In the pub-
licly held corporation, these interests simply are not aligned. Share-
holders bear all of the risk, while management prospers irrespective of
a corporation's financial performance. 68 Generally, executive com-
pensation does not bear a reasonable relationship to corporate per-
formance over the long run.
Game theory suggests strategies for curbing opportunistic behavior
by CEOs and other senior executives. The existing approach to exec-
utive compensation claims to align the two interests. It may even ap-
pear to do so in the short run. Currently, however, there are no
66. Id. at 786-88.
67. Id. at 789.
68. See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 48, at 31 ("CEO's get paid hugely in good years and if not
hugely, then merely wonderfully in bad years. So even the defense that high pay is required
because of the high risks being taken is shot full of holes."); Susanne Craig, Wall Street Pain
Stops at the Top: CEOs of Big Financial Firms Still Pull Down Fat Paychecks Despite a Dismal
Environment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at C1. "In good times boards justify the big pay pack-
ages by saying the executives are doing a great job and in bad times they justify the pay by saying
they are managing in a difficult environment. No matter what, they seem to find a way to ration-
alize it." Id. at C3.
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adverse financial consequences to senior executives who force a com-
pany into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Such financial consequences are
necessary to prevent harm to shareholders when a corporation enters
bankruptcy.
The Prisoner's Dilemma, the classic game theory exercise, 69 pro-
vides useful lessons that may be applied in the corporate arena. In
this exercise, two suspected robbers are arrested and separated. If
both refuse to accept a plea bargain implicating the other suspect,
both will receive light sentences for gun possession. If either one con-
fesses and agrees to testify against the other, the one who accepts a
plea receives a very light jail sentence of three months, while the other
receives the maximum sentence of ten years in prison. If both confess,
each will serve a moderately long sentence of eight years. 70 The pur-
pose of the exercise is to evaluate the circumstances under which peo-
ple choose to collaborate (cooperation) and, alternatively, at what
point people choose to maximize their self interest at the expense of
others.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game 7' in which it is
possible for one party to win, both parties to win, or neither party to
win.72 A "dominant strategy" is the best strategy for a player to
choose, irrespective of the other player's actions. In the Prisoner's
Dilemma, the dominant strategy for each player is to confess. If each
69. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-95 (1957); Roy J.
LEWICKI & JOSEPH A. LI-FERER, NEGOTIATION 35-37 (1985). The Prisoner's Dilemma is also
denominated in the plural as the Prisoners' Dilemma. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 48 (1994). The singular focuses on the individual's perspective, the plu-
ral on their joint situation.
70. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 69, at 95. Contemporary versions of the story can be found in
AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 89-91 (2d ed. 2004) and in BAIRD ET
AL., supra note 69. The hallmark of any Prisoner's Dilemma is that the suspect's best payoff
comes through confessing. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74. This concept has proven
easily confused by some otherwise very bright people. See, e.g., Robert Birmingham, Telling
Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, and Sup-
ply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 827, 842-45 (1997) (criticizing Judge Easterbrook's
explanation in Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989)); Lee Anne Fennell, Book
Note, 55 J. LEGAL ED. 295, 300-01 (2005) (reviewing ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET
CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING (2004)) (criticizing
Professor Malloy's textual mischaracterization). Both Judge Easterbrook and Professor Malloy
stated that the payoff for mutual silence is the same as the payoff for defecting on one's fellow
prisoner.
71. In a zero-sum game, one party's gain comes at the other party's expense and vice versa. In
a non-zero-sum game, all parties can mutually gain by expanding the size of the pie. DIXIT &
SKEATH, supra note 70, at 21.
72. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 69, at 96-97; LEWICKI & LITTERER, supra note 69, at 35. See
also Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 815,
822-25 (2001) (discussing Prisoner's Dilemma in the context of voting strategies in collective
decision making in the corporate arena).
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player chooses her dominant strategy, knowing that the other player
will choose his dominant strategy, that is known as a "Nash equilib-
rium."'73 In the Prisoner's Dilemma, however, a Nash equilibrium
leaves both players worse off than if they had cooperated and not con-
fessed. 74 This is one reason that the game's name is so apt.
TABLE 1: THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Prisoner B
Confess Not Confess
8 years for A 3 months for A
0 8 years for B l0 years for B
U
Prisoner A
10 years for A 1 year for A
U 3 months for B 1 year for B
z
Political scientist Robert Axelrod ran a series of computer simula-
tions of the Prisoner's Dilemma.75 Axelrod concluded that, if the
game was played out over the long run, the most successful strategy is
"tit for tat." An accused criminal would have the following perspec-
tive: "I expect you not to confess, so I behave the same way. If you
are bad and turn me in, then I am bad until you behave better." If the
game is only played out over the short run, however, this approach
fails. 76 Instead, the likelihood of a severe sanction imposed upon an
individual who behaves well (confesses) is needed to induce coopera-
tion. 77 For example, knowledge that the person who testifies against
73. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 70, at 87, 90.
74. Id. at 89-91.
75. More precisely, Axelrod invited game theorists in mathematics, political science, econom-
ics, and sociology to write computer programs to play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma simulation
tournament. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-32 (1984).
76. See id. at 32-55.
77. See id. at 124-32.
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his partner in crime would be severely beaten by other gang members
would induce his silence and persuade him to cooperate.
Initially, it may appear that negotiating the compensation package
of CEOs and other top managers is one of an infinite series of events
occurring over the long run. In fact, this is not so. The operative
event is not the repeated negotiation of the CEO's compensation
package, but rather the one-time event of the corporation facing
bankruptcy. Thus, the correct analogy is to playing the Prisoner's Di-
lemma only once.
Table 2-A below applies the principles of non-zero-sum game the-
ory to executive compensation and corporate performance. Fair com-
pensation is denoted as a CEO earning $500,000 annually, while
excessive compensation occurs when the CEO receives a compensa-
tion package worth $20 million annually. Although compensation
varies considerably from year to year, these numbers make the point
clearly. Here, the corporation is either profitable or insolvent. That
is, the insolvent corporation enters Chapter 11,78 while the profitable
corporation earns substantial revenues.
In the typical situation, the public corporation's compensation com-
mittee has strong incentives to maximize the CEO's pay package. 79
The CEO generally chooses who serves on the corporation's board of
directors.80 Directors are well paid for their part-time service to pub-
lic companies.81 Moreover, a CEO can directly reward directors
through business connections and other indirect benefits.82 In addi-
tion to financial considerations, social and psychological factors come
into play. Directors tend to respect the CEO who invited them to
serve on the board. Members of the board may well view themselves
as "part of the club."'83 This psychological income affects the board's
decision-making process. For the foregoing reasons, the board's com-
78. The Bankruptcy Code does not require a corporation to meet any insolvency test in order
for a corporation to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy; however, fraudulent conveyance law con-
cepts apply under both balance sheet insolvency and situations where the corporation is unable
to pay debts as they come due. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), (d), 101(9), (41) (Supp. 2007). But see
§ 303(h) (involuntary debtor unable to pay bills): U.F.T.A. § 2(a)-(b) (2006) (section 2(a)-bal-
ance sheet and section 2(b)-debts as come due).
79. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 63, at 23-38.
80. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 16, at 135.
81. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Lucky Directors (Harv. L. & Econ. Disc. Paper No. 573
Dec. 2006) (discussing the frequency and similarity of the lucrative stock options received by
both CEOs and directors).
82. See CRYSTAL, supra note 48, at 226-28 (describing the well-paid CEO-director as a valua-
ble social reference for future job prospects).
83. Upon earning tenure at her law school, a friend of mine received an email from her associ-
ate dean, a senior colleague, welcoming her into "the club." Given how independent faculty are
from each other, collegiality at a university is far less expected than in the boardroom.
[Vol. 57:1
WORKER RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY
pensation committee prefers to award the corporation's CEO excess
compensation over fair compensation. On the other hand, the com-
mittee has a stronger preference for the corporation's solvency.
Ordinarily, a significant portion of a CEO's compensation comes
from stock or stock options. That gives the CEO a strong economic
incentive to manipulate the short-term stock price in order to maxi-
mize his compensation. 84 Instead of dedicating his efforts to improv-
ing the corporation's performance and profits, the CEO may focus on
cheating.









L.2 CEO received $500,000 CEO received $20 million
0 Committee's second Committee's first
22 preference preference
U
.o E CEO received $1 million CEO received $40 million
a Committee's fourth Committee's third
QZ preference preference
As illustrated in the bottom right quadrant in Table 2-A, the corpo-
ration's compensation committee awarded the CEO excessive com-
84. Recent studies have found strong evidence of stock option manipulation known as
"backdating" among CEOs and boards of directors. These options are usually granted at-the-
money, meaning the exercise price of the options is set to equal the market price of the underly-
ing stock on the date of the grant. Because the option value is higher if the exercise price is
lower, directors and CEOs prefer to be granted options when the stock price is at its lowest.
Backdating allows executives to choose a past date when the market price was particularly low,
hence, inflating the value of the options. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs (Harv.
L. & Econ. Disc. Paper No. 566, Nov. 2006) (studying the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance and opportunistic grant manipulation and finding over 1,100 instances of CEOs "fortui-
tously" receiving grants at the lowest price of the month among corporations studied between
1996 and 2005); Bebchuk et al., supra note 81 (making similar findings among boards of direc-
tors); Randall A. Herron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around
Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (2007) (finding such grants were more
prevalent among high-technology firms).
2007]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
pensation, and the CEO has manipulated the stock price, a short-term
goal to further increase his total compensation. The latter behavior
came at the expense of improving corporate performance and ulti-
mately bankrupted the company. Through this behavior, however,
the CEO increased his compensation to $40 million. Many of the
dotcom companies that made public offerings in the 1990s and went
bust in 2000 and 2001 fit this profile.
In contrast, the top left quadrant represents the model company.
The compensation committee awarded reasonable compensation to
the CEO, and the CEO focused on the corporation's performance.
This approach is best exemplified by the Berkshire Hathaway Com-
pany, led by its legendary CEO, Warren Buffet. Buffet takes a rea-
sonable, even modest, salary, yet he has earned an extraordinary
fortune by improving the company's performance and, thereby, dra-
matically increasing the value of his stock in Berkshire Hathaway. 85
The top right quadrant probably reflects the majority of publicly
held corporations. The CEO assured himself lavish compensation,
but reinforced his entitlement to such pay and perks by growing the
company's profits and raising the value of the corporation. This may
be typical of the successful public company, exemplified by General
Electric (GE). Jack Welch personified this behavior, dramatically im-
proving GE's performance during his tenure, but also receiving an
enormous compensation package. 86 Not every company in this cate-
gory, however, is as successful as GE was under Welch. At some com-
panies, the CEO takes excessive compensation and endeavors to grow
the corporation's profits, but fails to do so. Recently, Home Depot's
CEO, Bob Nardelli, earned over $200 million after about five years of
service (over $40 million annually), despite a dismal record of nonper-
formance and failure to accomplish an increase in shareholder value
in a rising market. 87 In sum, the top right quadrant embraces both
companies that perform well and those that remain stagnant. A dis-
tinguishing feature of this category is that, in either case, the CEO has
obtained generous compensation from her board.
85. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate
America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 5 (1997) (collecting memoranda on various corporate govern-
ance topics from Mr. Buffet to his Board of Directors at Berkshire Hathaway).
86. The true extent of which became public during a messy divorce. See Rachel Emma
Silverman, Here's the Retirement Jack Welch Built: $1.4 Million a Month, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,
2002. at A15.
87. See Allan Sloan, Home Improvement Can Get Very Messy, NEWSWEEK. Jan. 22, 2007, at
20. See also Eric Dash, A Chairman's Fall; An Ousted Chiefs Going-Away Is Seen by Many as
Typically Excessive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at C4 (recounting ex-Pfizer CEO Henry A. McKin-
nell's multi-million dollar severance package).
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The bottom left quadrant represents a conundrum. Although the
CEO has been paid fair compensation, she apparently manipulated
the stock price to obtain more income and drove the company into
bankruptcy. Is this selfish behavior to increase personal income, or is
this risky behavior that fails, but is nonetheless permitted, by the busi-
ness judgment rule?









- D CEO received $500,000 CEO received $20 million
S Committee's second
2 C ee 'sc odCommittee's first preference0 preference
.2 . CEO received $330,000 CEO received $330,000
Committee's fourth Committee's third
S preference preference
Table 2-B represents the application of the bankruptcy proposals
contained in this Article. Three observations emerge from an exami-
nation of Tables 2-A and 2-B. First, the hallmark of any Prisoner's
Dilemma is that, while each player benefits by cooperating with the
other player-maximizing their joint payoff-neither is able to com-
municate her strategy in advance, so that one player cannot directly
influence the choices of the other player. When both players cooper-
ate, each achieves her second best result, albeit an ideal joint out-
come. On the other hand, an individual player fares best-receives
the highest payoff-if she defects when the other player cooperates.
This causes the latter player to suffer the worst possible payoff under
any of the four alternatives.
Here, however, the CEO influences the decision of the board as to
whether that CEO obtains a fair or excessive pay package. Moreover,
in Table 2-A, the CEO fares well under every scenario, except when
the board pays out fair compensation and the company nonetheless
enters Chapter 11. Indeed, the CEO optimizes her situation by ex-
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ploiting both sides of the pay equation, taking excess compensation,
and manipulating the stock price. The CEO's dominant strategy is to
pursue a course of stock manipulation, reflected in the boxes labeled
"Corporation Bankrupt," while the committee's dominant strategy is
to grant excessive compensation. The CEO's strong dominant strat-
egy leads to the top right quadrant, while her weak dominant strategy
leads to the bottom right quadrant. The likely result is that companies
end up on the "Excessive Compensation" side of Table 2-A. Here,
both players reach a Nash equilibrium. Thus, Table 2-A reflects an
imperfect example of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The theory underlying
the Prisoner's Dilemma is, nonetheless, instructive.
Second, the bottom left and right quadrants significantly change
from Table 2-A to Table 2-B. Table 2-B applies the Bankruptcy Code
rules recommended by this Article. This effectively transforms the
payoffs that the CEO obtains, making stock manipulation an undesir-
able choice. The CEO's preferences now align with those of the com-
mittee: both prefer excess compensation and corporate profitability.
In the left quadrant of Table 2-B, the CEO realizes a relatively moder-
ate decrease in compensation, from $1 million annually to $330,000
annually. It is unclear whether the result in this quadrant is due to the
CEO's misconduct or simply bad fortune.
The bottom right quadrant of Table 2-B, however, stands on mark-
edly different footing. Because the bottom right quadrant represents
cheating by the CEO-with the CEO taking excessive compensation
through the board and also manipulating the stock price to further
line his pockets-a dramatic penalty is imposed.88 The CEO's com-
pensation declines from $40 million to $330,000 annually. This severe
sanction punishes the CEO's misconduct and partly remedies the loss
sustained by the employees' 401(k) pension funds.89 Table 2-B dem-
onstrates that a severe sanction will persuade all but the corporate
grifters of the world not to take from both pockets.90 Thus, insights
from the Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrate that this sanctioning
scheme can work.
88. LUtE & RAIFFA, supra note 69, at 97 (suggesting that "one essential role of government is
to declare that the rules of certain social [economic] 'games' must be changed whenever it is
inherent in the game situation that the players, in pursuing their own ends, will be forced into a
socially undesirable position").
89. See supra note 1. Where clear securities fraud or other criminal acts have taken place,
litigation by disgruntled shareholders and by federal regulatory bodies may catch and punish
some CEOs and their boards. This occurred at Enron, WorldCom, and some now defunct
dotcom companies.
90. For example, these dishonest CEOs include Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom and Ken Lay of
Enron. Id.
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Because there is currently no relationship between corporate per-
formance and executive compensation, there is no risk sharing on the
part of executives, and only shareholders bear the risk of loss. There
are no incentives for executives to work for the benefit of sharehold-
ers, because the CEO faces no consequences for poor performance.
CEOs do well and take whatever compensation they choose: what
might be described as the gluttony effect. 9' The effect of the separa-
tion of ownership from control, then, is that management does well all
the time, irrespective of the corporation's outcome.
Third, so far, Tables 2-A and 2-B above have focused on the corpo-
ration's CEO and compensation committee. What about the stock-
holders? Their preference is for a profitable corporation and fair
compensation. Under Table 2-A, the CEO and the committee prefer
either quadrant containing excess compensation. At least under Table
2-B, the CEO and the committee will prefer a profitable corporation,
even if it is most likely the quadrant containing excess compensation.
In conclusion, modeling corporate behavior in this manner enables
policymakers to alter the CEO's behavior. Although this approach
reduces the likelihood of stock manipulation and unprofitable corpo-
rations, its major limitation is that it does not produce the best result:
a profitable corporation and fair compensation.
VI. THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
While the reasons for reforming executive compensation exist inde-
pendently of whether a publicly held company is solvent, this reform
proposal is closely tied to a company's decision to file for bankruptcy.
There is a compelling logic in distinguishing between a profitable com-
pany and an insolvent one. A stockholder in a publicly held company,
one listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ stock exchanges, can always sell
her shares if she is dissatisfied with either the stock or the company's
performance. 92 This point was recently emphasized when an embat-
tled CEO graphically declared that, if shareholders did not trust the
management, "then they should sell the goddamned stock and never
ask another question!" 93 Shareholders can unload stock even from
financially troubled companies outside of bankruptcy, albeit perhaps
at a disappointing price. In contrast, once a company files for bank-
91. See, e.g., Jerry Useem, CEO Pay, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2003.
92. Similarly, shareholders have voting rights to elect or withhold a vote for the board of
directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 212 (2006).
93. Sasha Talcott, In the Gray World of Banking, Jay Sidhu Stands Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
23, 2005, at D1 (quoting Jay Sidhu, CEO of Sovereign Bancorp. from John Engen, Big Noise
from Wyomissing, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1, 2005, at 34).
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ruptcy, the shareholders ordinarily find that their stock is delisted and
worthless. In theory, shareholders continue to possess nearly all of
the rights that they held outside of bankruptcy.94 If the corporation
were liquidated, however, shareholders, as the owners of the debtor-
corporation, would receive payment for their stock only after all credi-
tors were fully paid. Chapter 11 bankruptcy accounts for this principle
under the absolute priority rule.95 In a corporate reorganization, eq-
uity is wiped out unless the claims are fully paid. Reorganization pro-
ponents assume that the shareholders will vote against confirming the
reorganization plan, because it wipes out their equity. In the process
94. See, e.g., Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995) (discussing shareholder
rights to initiate a special meeting to remove the board in response to a hostile takeover threat):
Smith v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc.. 617 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (voting proce-
dure by shareholders for removal of a director according to accepted industry practice was not
illegal or against corporate bylaws). Depending on the rules governing a corporation. the share-
holders may have a difficult time exercising their voting rights when it comes to the board of
directors. See Seth W. Ashby, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: Limited
Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 521, 522-23 (2005) (criticizing the corporate voting structure that allows CEO/
directors, such as Michael Eisner, to retain power despite shareholder discontent by playing fast
and loose with the rules); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416. 1430 (1989) (suggesting that a greater shareholder voice will
lead to increased stock prices and an overall healthier corporation: "The mechanism by which
stocks are valued ensures that the price reflects the terms of governance and operation."); Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (discussing the benefits of a
corporate model, whereby the shareholders elect the members of the board: "If the stockhold-
ers are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate de-
mocracy are at their disposal to turn the board out."); Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of
Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503,
504-06, 560 (1993) (recommending stricter judicial scrutiny of management's defensive tactics
against shareholder proxies): Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democ-
racy": Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 735, 765-66
(2003) (recommending increased shareholder access to corporate proxies, but concluding that
dissident success in ousting incumbent management will remain difficult, because most share-
holders will simply choose to sell their stock instead).
95. See Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Say. Assoc. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 436
(1999) (assuming that the absolute priority rule even contains a new value corollary or excep-
tion. debtor's pre-bankruptcy equity holders could not, over the objection of a senior class of
impaired creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership interests in a reorganized en-
tity without allowing others to compete for that equity or to propose competing reorganization
plans). See also Josef S. Athanas, Using Bankruptcy Law to Implement or Combat Hostile Take-
overs of Targets in Chapter 11, 55 Bus. LAW. 593 (2000).
The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in the recent LaSalle case, however, that a plan of
reorganization is unconfirmable if it permits the owners of the debtor to retain their
ownership interest in exchange for new capital without extending the opportunity to
other parties to either offer competing bids for the ownership equity of the debtor or
propose competing plans, has significantly improved the leverage of hostile bidders.
Id. at 623. Shareholders are the real losers in such situations, as corporate equity is depleted in
the bankruptcy proceeding and their stock's value drops to zero, while top executives and enter-
prising outside bidders are the only ones who benefit.
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known as "cramdown," a confirmation plan is forced upon dissenting
impaired classes.96 Granted, the unsecured creditors could agree to
give something to the equity holders to speed up negotiations over a
plan for reorganization. Given the time value of money, creditors
might be so persuaded, because interest on their claims is rarely
paid.97 This is unlikely in large reorganizations, however, unless there
is an equity participant who organizes and represents the class.98 The
Bankruptcy Code creates a series of creditors' committees and per-
mits equity holders to form a committee to advance their interests.
Moreover, because their stock is worthless, small and diffuse share-
holders are marginalized in typical reorganizations. 99 Ironically, the
incumbent management remains at the helm, at least initially, when a
corporation files for bankruptcy.
The impact on employee shareholders is far worse. Even successful
corporate reorganizations substantially downsize workforces. Thus,
many employee shareholders lose both their jobs and their pension
funds, a double blow. Moreover, those workers who remain em-
ployed often find their pay and benefits cut.
96. See Bratton, Berle and Means, supra note 39, at 746.
Under absolute priority, no holder in a junior position can receive any value under a
reorganization plan if any objecting holder in a senior position receives less than full
value with respect to his claim. In other words, absolute priority wipes out insiders
holding common stock if any senior bond or preferred holder receives less than one
hundred cents on the dollar.
Id.
97. See Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On The Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority,
and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 235 n.36 (1989) (recounting a teaching story in a bankruptcy
negotiation exercise that signifies the importance of the concepts of present value and time value
of money).
98. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 195 (1990)
(In large, corporate bankruptcies, "the relative size of equity's recovery appeared to be not so
much a product of the financial conditions of the company as it was a product of the quality and
aggressiveness of equity's representation"); see also Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New
Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1983) (advocating a rule
requiring an all-common-equity corporate structure as a legal "traffic regulator" in bankruptcy);
David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization
Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461, 519-33 (1992) (suggesting a change in the current bankruptcy voting
rules to allow creditors a better opportunity to collectively bargain, thus increasing their chances
of recouping more money in settlement).
99. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993) (discussing
empirical evidence of the common misalignment between shareholder interests, creditor inter-
ests, and management objectives in large-scale Chapter 11 cases); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 861 (2004) (suggesting that contractual-
ism or a privately ordered recovery process in bankruptcy is at "a dead end" due to control
disparities between small and large parties in the settlement negotiation).
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Corporate executives are unjustly enriched if they are permitted to
keep excess executive compensation given to them by the corporation
they mismanaged into bankruptcy. 00 Restitution, resolving unjust en-
richment, is an old, ideal concept.' 0 ' Financially distressed companies
often project an image of economic health. Otherwise, rank and file
workers, low- and mid-level management, investors, suppliers, and
lenders will abandon the company. At least initially, only senior exec-
utives will know that the business is in financial trouble or at risk of
failing. Those executives will continue to draw a salary, bonuses, and
other perks, as well as profit from stock sales. Workers, unaware of an
impending fiscal crisis, will not take the necessary steps to prevent
economic catastrophe. Employee plaintiffs make a powerful case for
disgorgement, because they can show that defendant executives have
unjustly enriched themselves by the benefit workers have conferred
on the executives by supporting the company.10 2
Judge Posner, responding to the majority's holding in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot that a judicial lien intended to secure a spouse's preexist-
ing interest in marital property was avoidable under § 522(f), 10 3 wrote
the following: "I had thought bankruptcy a branch rather than a re-
jection of equity .... [W]hen a debtor uses the Code to steal from his
former wife we should not lightly conclude that the Code, properly
read, commands such a result. 10 4 As the property division allocated
during the dissolution of a marriage seeks to compensate both spouses
for their contributions to the marriage, so too the Bankruptcy Code
ought to recognize that the sweat equity of rank and file workers,
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion
Draft 2000) (noting that -[a] person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is re-
quired to make restitution to the other").
101. Id.
102. See Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Accuses Former Sunbeam Official of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2001, at Al. See also Steven Kropp, A Case of Misplaced Priorities: A Proposed Solution to
Resolve the Apparent Conflict Between Sections 507 and 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1459 (1997) (proposing a harmonization of §§ 507 and 1113 by treating an un-
rejected collective bargaining agreement the same as a § 507 administrative claim).
103. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S. 291 (1991). See also Richard E. Flint, Bank-
ruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 577 (1991) ("[S]ociety's humanitarian response to the debtor in
the granting of exemptions is mutually dependent upon the fair dealing on the part of the debtor
with his creditors.").
104. Farrey, 899 F.2d at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting). The 2005 Amendments codified this re-
sult by barring the discharge of all marital property settlements in § 523(a)(15). 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(15) (Supp. 2007) (to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and "not of the
kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
court of record, a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a govern-
mental unit").
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along with their purchases of company stock, bolstered the company's
stock price; enabled the corporation's executives to obtain generous
executive pay packages; and allowed them to sell their stock at a
higher market price. When the corporation later reorganizes under
Chapter 11, those executives should be required to account for the
economic looting of the employees' pension funds.
VII. EXTENDING EXISTING DOCTRINES
Common law and statutory developments have shaped the relation-
ship between corporate debtors and their creditors. One key feature
of bankruptcy law and policy is the power of the trustee or DIP to
upset certain previous commercial transactions. These "avoiding pow-
ers" are designed to promote equity among unsecured creditors. 10 5
The reform proposals advanced in this Article build upon these legal
concepts. This Article's proposals differ from these concepts in that
the remedy runs first to protect employees' pension funds and only
secondarily to other creditors. This Part explores two areas of com-
mon law and their applicability to bankruptcy law: fraudulent convey-
ance law and the duty of loyalty. Section A describes the
development of fraudulent conveyance law and argues for an exten-
sion of the concepts found in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to
the excessive compensation paid to the CEOs of corporations in bank-
ruptcy.10 6 Subsection Al details the extreme example of excessive
CEO compensation described in the Walt Disney litigation regarding
Michael Ovitz's compensation package. 107 Subsection A2 discusses
the related duty of loyalty that a CEO owes her corporation. 10 8 Fi-
nally, Section B explores the theory of preference law in bankruptcy
and its clear application to excessive compensation paid to CEOs of
insolvent publicly held corporations.10 9
105. Although not commonly referred to as an "avoiding power," the DIP also has the au-
thority under § 365 to abrogate unfavorable executory contracts and confine the non-breaching
party to its unsecured claim for damages. Collective bargaining agreements that cover unionized
workers receive limited, though preferential, treatment under § 1113 when a company reorgan-
izes in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Kropp, supra note 52.
106. See infra notes 110-134 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 135-160 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 169-193 and accompanying text.
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A. Fraudulent Conveyance Law
The concept of fraudulent conveyance is over four hundred years
old. 110 A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by a debtor, including a
sale or gift, of her assets into someone else's hands to prevent her
creditors from reaching those assets. Contemporary fraudulent con-
veyance law includes a mix of common law, state statutory law, and
the Bankruptcy Code. Fraudulent conveyance law should apply when
the corporation, by paying senior executives excessive pay packages,
moves assets that would have been available to creditors.
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), adopted by most
states, reaches two kinds of transactions.' 11 First, Section 4 prohibits
an insolvent or financially troubled debtor from disposing of or trans-
ferring her property to another party in order to prevent her creditors
from reaching that property. Subsection 4(a) applies where a debtor
has actual intent-similar to mens rea in tort or criminal law-to de-
fraud her creditors. Subsection 4(b) applies where the debtor did not
receive reasonably equivalent value (REV) for the exchange and the
debtor was either undercapitalized or reasonably should have be-
lieved that it would incur unpayable debts.112 This subsection applies
both to present and future creditors. Thus, the transfer can be at-
tacked not only by those who were creditors at the time the transac-
tion took place, but also by those who will become creditors someday
in the future.
Section 5 provides that, as to existing creditors, but not as to future
creditors, a transfer is fraudulent if the debtor did not receive REV
for the exchange. This requires, however, that the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of the transfer or has become insolvent as a result of
the transfer. This situation can be found in cases where the corpora-
tion has "cooked the books." The Enron and WorldCom scandals
110. 13 Eliz. 5 (1570). This early English statute made fraudulent conveyance a criminal of-
fense, punishable by forfeiture, half to the complaining creditor and half to the crown. Robert
Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505, 505
n.1 (1977).
111. See generally Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, §§ 1-13, 2 U.L.A. 13 (2006). UFTA,
promulgated in 1984, modernized the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA). Compare
Clark, supra note 110, at 560-61 (noting the lack of clarity in the law and of explicit analysis in
reported cases concerning the concept of "fair consideration" and fraudulent conveyance law in
general, before the passage of the UFTA), with Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain Deal-
ing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REV.
469, 485-94 (1988) (discussing case law developments after the passage of the UFTA and noting
increased judicial invalidation of a broad range of transactions).
112. In updating the statute, the concept of REV in UFTA replaced the concept of fair con-
sideration in UFCA.
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presented such a picture. 113 In each case, the applicable transfer oc-
curred when the corporation paid its senior executives excessive com-
pensation at a time when the corporations were insolvent.
On a continuum, executive compensation ranges from fair to waste-
ful. REV should be understood as fair compensation. One clear ob-
stacle, however, exists to the application of fraudulent conveyance law
in this setting. Quite simply, how do courts measure REV from the
CEO? The corporation, after all, obtained his employment services in
exchange for his compensation package. Consideration concepts do
not apply here: there is always valid consideration in the employment
setting, because an employee swaps his labor for the compensation
paid by his employer. 114 REV suggests a useful starting point to as-
certain whether a bankrupt corporation's CEO received excessive
compensation, such that excess compensation must be disgorged. A
comparison may be made with the alternative standards in corporate
law generally.
In Rogers v. Hill, an early and influential executive compensation
case, an incentive compensation system was established through a cor-
porate bylaw widely approved by the shareholders in 1912.115 The
system provided that the president and five vice presidents receive
10% of the company's annual profits above the company's 1910 earn-
ings.116 By 1929, the American Tobacco Company, maker of Lucky
113. Enron laid off thousands of workers (4,500 employees in Houston alone). See Marianne
Lavelle & Matthew Benjamin, The Biggest Bust: Workers and Stockholders Are Enron's Worst
Casualties, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 2001, at 34 (discussing the consequences of
Enron's collapse). Enron workers and retirees testified before Congress, pleading for bank-
ruptcy reform to protect their retirement savings. Julie Mason, The Fall of Enron, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 24, 2002, at A13. Enron employees fared better than most. Aided by the AFL-
CIO, Enron's former workers successfully sued and obtained settlements ($40 million) from Ar-
thur Anderson Worldwide and obtained a settlement through negotiations in New York Bank-
ruptcy Court ($30 million) to provide severance pay capped at $13,500 each for about 4,200
employees. See Edward Iwata, Payouts Anger Former Enron Workers, USA TODAY, June 18,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/energy/enron/2002-06-18-pay.htm#more. The
New York Bankruptcy Court also authorized former Enron employees to challenge the reten-
tion bonuses paid to executives as preferences or fraudulent conveyances. See Nancy B. Rapo-
port, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1382 n.54 (2003) (citing
to former Enron employees' complaint).
114. See, e.g., Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 161 A. 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) (an early case
finding consideration where a retiring executive receives a pension in exchange for a non-com-
pete clause), rev'd, 178 A. 490 (Pa. 1935) (jury award later reversed on grounds of lack of corpo-
rate authority). Compare Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 218 A.2d 526, 532-33 (Conn. 1966)
(finding consideration where a retiring executive received pension in exchange for consulting
services), with Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 389 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stock options granted to
retiring CEO were not waste even though CEO performed no additional duties and thus com-
pany received no consideration).
115. 289 U.S. 582, 584-85 (1933).
116. Id. at 584 n.1.
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Strike cigarettes, was so successful that the incentive system provided
extraordinarily generous bonuses to those six executives. 17 A hand-
ful of dissenting shareholders challenged the bonus system as applied
in 1929 and 1930.118 The Second Circuit majority dismissed the
case, 119 prompting a dissent by Judge Swan:
If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which
it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders
have no power to give away corporate property against the protest
of the minority .... [A] bonus of $840,000 to an officer receiving a
fixed salary of $168,000 is presumptively so much beyond fair com-
pensation for services as to make a prima facie showing that the
corporation is giving away money, and a by-law which sanctions this
is prima facie unreasonable, and hence unlawful.12 0
Although the Supreme Court found the corporate bylaw valid as
adopted by the shareholders, the Court nonetheless reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit decision. 21 The Court approvingly quoted the excerpt
above from Judge Swan's dissent. However, it did not include the last
sentence regarding fair compensation.1 22 The Court did not directly
address the fairness standard espoused by Judge Swan to govern dis-
putes over excessive executive compensation. Rather, the Court con-
cluded that the dissenting shareholders should prevail if they could
demonstrate that the bonuses paid to the executives constituted cor-
porate waste. The case then settled out of court. 123
The final word came nearly a decade later in Heller v. Boylan.124
There, different plaintiffs challenged the American Tobacco Com-
pany's incentive compensation system. The New York trial judge be-
gan his opinion by recounting previous federal litigation and the facts
117. Id. at 585 n.2.
118. Id. at 585. Prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a shareholder
plaintiff who could establish diversity jurisdiction could choose between state and federal com-
mon law.
119. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1932). Judge Manton authored the majority opinion,
joined by Judge Chase. Manton, however, took bribes in a number of cases, apparently includ-
ing this one, ultimately forcing him off the bench and into jail. See U.S. v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834
(2d Cir. 1939).
120. Rogers, 60 F.2d at 113-14 (Swan, J., dissenting). Judge Swan went on to point out that, in
1930, the president also received "special cash credits" of $270,000 and participated with the
other officers in a distribution "of almost 30,000 shares of stock at $87 per share less than its then
market value." Id. at 114.
121. The plaintiff shareholders had contended that "the by-law is invalid and that, even if
valid, the amounts paid under it are unreasonably large and therefore subject to revision by the
courts." Rogers, 289 U.S. at 585.
122. Id. at 591-92.
123. See Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The defendant was unsuccessful
both in seeking to vacate the settlement Rogers struck in the American Tobacco Company litiga-
tion and in challenging the fee Rogers received as plaintiff.
124. 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), afftd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
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regarding the shareholder approved bylaw. 125 The judge noted that
the shareholders had twice ratified the payments made to the execu-
tives under the bylaw in 1933 and in 1940.126 The judge ruled that the
appropriate standard was not fair compensation, but rather waste or
spoilation. 127 After characterizing the compensation plan as "lush, 1 28
"munificent," "princely," "fabulous," "fantastic,"'' 29 and even as "im-
mense, staggeringly so,"1130 the judge concluded that the performance
basis made the bonuses legitimate. The judge distinguished between
permissible excessive compensation and impermissible waste, finding
that only the latter violated corporate law norms.' 3 ' The court was
also influenced both by the high federal income tax rates applicable at
that time and the fact that so few shareholders, both in total number
and in the amount of shares owned, challenged the payments.' 32
Heller reflects the modern approach to executive compensation.
Delaware courts have also shown little inclination to police the levels
of executive compensation. 33 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court
125. Id. at 660-61, 663-65.
126. Id. at 667.
127. The New York trial judge erroneously believed that the U.S. Supreme Court's standards
controlled. Id. at 665. Accord Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
128. Heller, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
129. Id. at 669.
130. Id. at 671.
131. Id. at 673.
132. On an annual salary of $1 million, an executive would have paid over $700,000 in federal
taxes; on an annual salary of $500,000, an executive would have paid over $330,000 in federal
taxes. Id. at 674.
133. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2006) ("Appoint such officers and agents
as the business of the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise provide for them suitable
compensation."); § 122(15) ("Pay pensions and establish and carry out pension, profit sharing,
stock option, stock purchase, stock bonus, retirement, benefit, incentive and compensation plans,
trusts and provisions for any or all of its directors, officers, and employees."). Delaware's role as
the primary source of state corporate law, arguably because of the "race to the bottom," remains
controversial. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Del-
aware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 669-701 (1974) (asserting the race to the bottom theory and recom-
mending federal legislation to provide uniform standards governing fiduciary duties for public
corporations to protect shareholders), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protec-
tion, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (asserting an opposite,
"race to the top" theory: "With all due respect both to Professor Cary and to the almost univer-
sal academic support for his position, it is implausible on its face."), and Roberta Romano, Com-
petition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843,
859-60 (1993) (arguing in favor of state competition for corporate charters, singling out Dela-
ware as a leader in, among others, takeover statutes), and Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Ex-
changes and the Regulation of Dual Class Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 127-28 (1987) (rejecting
the race to the bottom thesis as based on three misconceptions: "(1) that managers prefer ex-
change rules that allow them to exploit investors; (2) that it is in the interest of exchanges to
adopt such rules; and (3) that the absence of regulation is necessarily evidence of a pro-manage-
ment, anti-investor bias."). More recently, a critical reappraisal of Delaware's role has emerged.
See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
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recently commented that "the size of executive compensation for a
large public company in the current environment often involves huge
numbers." 134
1. The Absence of Meaningful Standards in the Corporate Context:
The Case of Ovitz and The Walt Disney Company
The extensive litigation over the $130 million severance package
paid to Michael Ovitz by The Walt Disney Company is an extreme
illustration of excessive compensation.1 35 On October 1, 1995, Disney
and Ovitz executed a five-year employment agreement, and Ovitz be-
gan his tenure as president of Disney. Michael Eisner, Disney's Board
Chairman and CEO, personally hired Ovitz, a close social friend of
twenty-five years. 136 A supine board, dominated by Eisner, readily
acquiesced.1 37 Ovitz, however, had no previous experience running a
publicly held corporation.138 Moreover, Eisner's mercurial manage-
ment style suggested an inability to work with well-known executives
who wanted to succeed him as CEO.1 39 The decision to hire Ovitz
proved to be a poor one, but precisely the kind of decision the busi-
ness judgment rule was designed to protect. Ovitz's financial deal,
however, stood on a different footing.
REV. 679, 748-49 (2002) (concluding that Delaware is not a leader in competition for corporate
charters, because there is no competition; the barriers to entry into competition are simply too
high for most states); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 634-40
(2003) (noting the dynamic tension between Delaware's judiciary and the threat of federal legis-
lation to curb perceived abuses).
134. Brehm v. Eisner (Disney I), 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.49 (Del. 2000); accord In re Walt Dis-
ney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27. 54 n.72 (Del. 2006).
135. Disney V. 906 A.2d at 27; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d
693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
136. Disney lV, 907 A.2d. at 699-711 (recounting Ovitz's arrival at Disney). Chancellor
Chandler faulted Eisner's role in hiring Ovitz, including his usurping the board's role and pres-
suring the board to approve both Ovitz's hiring and compensation package through a premature
press release, but concluded that Eisner did not act in bad faith and was not grossly negligent.
Id. at 762-63.
137. Id. at 700-01. "[Eisner was] the instigator and mastermind behind the machinations that
resulted in Ovitz's hiring and concomitant approval of the [hiring agreement]. In that aspect,
Eisner is the most culpable of the defendants. He was pulling the strings: he knew what was
going on." Id. at 760. Between 1997 and 1999, Business Week ranked the Disney Board of
Directors as the worst board in corporate America. See John A. Byrne, The Best & the Worst
Boards, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 2000, at 142 (1999 data); John A. Byrne et al., The Best and Worst
Boards, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 90 (1997 data).
138. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 702.
139. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I1), 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003).
See also Disney If, 746 A.2d at 250. The departure of Jeffrey Katzenberg, former head of Disney
Studios, embroiled Disney in litigation that apparently cost Disney $250 million to settle. Disney
IV, 907 A.2d at 717.
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The provision giving rise to the litigation was a no fault termination
clause. Under that clause, if Disney fired Ovitz, other than for gross
negligence or malfeasance, Ovitz received his entire unpaid compen-
sation as severance pay: the balance of his salary, including his $7.5
million annual bonuses, three million shares in stock options worth
their current market price,'140 and $10 million in lieu of stock earned if
the contract was not mutually renewed. 141 The no fault termination
clause created a perverse incentive system. If Ovitz were to leave, he
would maximize his profits by terminating employment as soon as
possible.' 42
Irwin Russell, chairman of the Disney Board's four-person compen-
sation committee and Eisner's personal attorney, negotiated the terms
of Ovitz's compensation. 143 Russell warned Eisner that Ovitz's com-
pensation was "at the top level for any corporate officer ... and that
the number of stock options granted [him] ...was far beyond the
standards applied within Disney and corporate America."1 44 Conse-
quently, Russell recommended another study to justify the deal. 145
Disney then retained Graef Crystal, a noted executive compensa-
tion expert who had consulted on Disney's behalf for many years, to
advise the compensation committee. Crystal informed Eisner and
Russell that no non-CEO president of a public company had ever ob-
tained an Ovitz-style compensation package. 146 Disney had a policy,
consistent with Crystal's philosophy, against frontloading its executive
compensation, such as through a signing bonus.' 47 The rationale
against awarding an executive with a signing bonus in a long-term con-
tract was that, if the executive left the company prematurely, then the
effective compensation for the time employed escalated dramatically.
140. Initially, Ovitz was guaranteed not less than $50 million in appreciation. Because of ad-
verse tax consequences to Disney, Ovitz's deal required renegotiating. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at
703-04.
141. Id.
142. The personnel practice at Disney, and in much of the entertainment industry, is to grant
long-term contracts to most senior and even mid-level executives. In the aftermath of the Ovitz
fiasco, Disney began scaling back this practice. See Bruce Orwall, Careers: At Disney, A Push to
Eliminate Job Contracts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1999, at B1, B6.
143. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 702. Besides Russell, the other three members of Disney's com-
pensation committee consisted of the actor Sidney Poitier, who had recently joined the board
and had been represented for many years as an actor by Ovitz: Raymond Watson, a long-time
Disney board member; and Ignacio Lozano, publisher of a major Spanish language newspaper.
Id. at 766-67.
144. Id. at 704.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 705 n.41, 708 n.80.
147. Id. at 703. See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney lII), 825 A.2d 275,
280 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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Ironically, the no fault termination clause produced the same undesir-
able risk, because it was qualified only if Ovitz quit or was fired for
misconduct.
Subsequently, the compensation committee spent about twenty-five
minutes reviewing the Ovitz agreement and discussed the appropriate
bonus for Mr. Russell, eventually rewarding him $250,000 for his ef-
forts in securing Ovitz's employment. 48 In less than one year, Eisner
decided to terminate Ovitz's employment.149 Several months of nego-
tiations over Ovitz's departure ensued, and, by December 1996, Ovitz
walked away from Disney under the no fault termination provision
with $130 million.15 0
In response, several stockholders filed a shareholder's derivative
suit. They contended that Eisner and the Board breached their fiduci-
ary duties by both approving the terms of Ovitz's employment con-
tract and by failing to terminate Ovitz for cause, thereby triggering
Ovitz's rights to substantial severance pay.' 5 1
The Delaware Chancery Court criticized Eisner and the Disney
Board in unusually caustic language: 52 "[Eisner] enthroned himself
as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic King-
dom . . ."153 The court elaborated as follows:
[By virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO, and
his control over Ovitz's hiring in particular, Eisner to a large extent
is responsible for the failings in process that infected and handi-
capped the board's decision making abilities. Eisner stacked his
(and I intentionally write "his" as opposed to "the Company's")
board of directors with friends and other acquaintances .. 154
Chancellor Chandler decided, however, that Eisner had acted in good
faith, because he sincerely believed that Ovitz's hiring was in the com-
pany's best interest. 155 The Chancellor defended the magnitude of
Ovitz's employment contract on the grounds that Ovitz was poten-
tially giving up $150 million in earned commissions. 156
148. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 708-09, 709 n.88.
149. Id. at 724.
150. Id. at 724-37.
151. Id. at 697.
152. After initially dismissing the Complaint with prejudice, on appeal, the Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded to permit the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.
Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000).
153. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 763,
154. Id. at 760.
155. Id. at 763.
156. Id.
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court. 57 The court outlined best practices in these circumstances as
follows: the compensation expert prepares a spreadsheet describing
the total amounts Ovitz would earn under the contract, under the
foreseeable alternatives. These alternatives would include the cost to
Disney under the no fault termination clause for each year of the pro-
posed five-year contract. The expert presents her analysis to the com-
pensation committee's members at the first meeting. The committee
attaches the expert's spreadsheet to the committee's minutes. This
spreadsheet then forms the basis for the committee's decision. 158
Despite deficiencies, the trial court found that the Committee knew
the material facts of Ovitz's contract terms and the entire Board re-
ceived a report from the chair of the compensation committee. Be-
cause, under Delaware law, the committee was permitted to rely upon
the expert and the Board was permitted to rely upon its committee,
the Court concluded that the failure to follow best practices consti-
tuted negligence, but agreed with the Chancellor that it did not rise to
the level of gross negligence. 59 It is not surprising that the pro-man-
agement Delaware judiciary harshly rebuked the CEO and the Board
for their mishandling of the process and substance of the transaction,
yet found no violation of Delaware law. When a Delaware corporate
board and a four-member compensation committee 160 get a free pass
from legal responsibility, the sky is the limit when it comes to execu-
tive compensation.
2. Fairness and the Duty of Loyalty
Executive compensation implicates the duty of loyalty, because the
CEO and other top executives generally serve as inside directors on
the board. Moreover, the CEO seeks to maximize her compensation,
while it is in the company's best interests to pay her no more than
necessary. 161 Accordingly, when shareholders challenge the compen-
sation paid to a senior executive, one might conclude that the execu-
tive must demonstrate that, like any other self-dealing transaction, the
compensation agreement is fair. That is not the case, however.
157. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
158. Id. at 56.
159. Id. at 59-60.
160. Russell, the Chair of the Compensation Committee and the CEO's personal attorney,
also had a financial interest in the successful outcome of the Ovitz contract negotiations: the
expectation that he would obtain a substantial bonus, which he did. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
161. See Kropp, supra note 52.
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Courts do not want to evaluate stockholder challenges to the fairness
of CEO compensation.
The modern practice in handling executive compensation is re-
flected in the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). Under the
MBCA, the board appoints a committee of outside (non-employee),
disinterested, and independent directors to negotiate the compensa-
tion of top managers. 162 An executive compensation firm or expert
consultant then advises the compensation committee. 163 The resulting
pay package is immunized from duty of loyalty and fairness reviews.
Instead, this pay package is subject only to the duty of care as re-
flected in the business judgment rule.164 That relaxed standard de-
mands that the challenging shareholders prove either that the
directors, through the compensation committee, failed to make an in-
formed decision based on all material information reasonably availa-
ble to them or that the decision constituted gross negligence. 165
Moreover, even if the directors committed gross negligence, the com-
pany's certificate of incorporation may absolve them of financial lia-
bility.166 Finally, the Delaware indemnification statute, typically
adopted by public corporations, further insulates directors from re-
sponsibility for even grossly negligent decisions. 167
The policies underlying fraudulent conveyance law offer another
reason to treat excessive executive compensation in cases of corporate
bankruptcy differently from cases involving solvent companies. Com-
pensation that can justifiably be criticized as lush, munificent,
princely, fabulous, fantastic, or staggeringly immense can be tolerated
if it comes at the expense of shareholders, who have the power to
remove the incumbent members of the board of directors. 168 It should
not be permitted once a company files for bankruptcy, because then
the interests of creditors are paramount.
162. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.25 (1998) (Committees, Official Comment: "nominating and
compensation committees, composed primarily or entirely of nonmanagement directors, have
also become more widely used by publicly held corporations"); § 8.11 (Compensation of Direc-
tors provides that the board of directors sets its own pay). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(c) (2006).
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 141(e) (2006) (board and committee members are entitled to
rely upon qualified experts who are selected with reasonable care).
164. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.62 (1998) (Directors' Actions). See generally supra notes
135-159 and accompanying text.
165. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also In re Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("It is rare when a court imposes
liability on directors of a corporation for breach of the duty of care.").
166. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 1,02(b)(7) (2006).
167. § 145(a)-(b).
168. See, e.g., §§ 141-46, 212.
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B. Preference Law
No law prohibits a solvent corporation from choosing to pay one
creditor at the expense of another. Even a distressed business can
decide which bills to pay and which to ignore.169 Bankruptcy laws,
however, are quite different. A cardinal principle of bankruptcy law is
equality among similarly situated creditors. Therefore, under § 547
(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may recover preferential
payments from an insider 170 made by the company within one year of
its bankruptcy filing. 171
Excess executive compensation unrelated to corporate performance
constitutes a preferential transfer by an insolvent corporation to its
insider officers. That is, excess income was paid to one set of credi-
tors-senior executives-at the expense of other creditors-including
average workers. It is a preferential transfer, because the Internal
Revenue Code prohibits a deduction for non-performance-based com-
pensation that exceeds $1 million to the CEO and other senior officers
of a publicly held corporation. 172 Moreover, independent of the fed-
eral tax code, CEOs and other senior employees whose remuneration
is unrelated to their corporation's performance have arguably
breached their duty of loyalty to the corporation.
There are, however, a number of defenses to a preference action,
and several may well apply. here. One exception to preference liabil-
ity is the "contemporaneous exchange for new value" requirement. 173
The purpose behind the contemporaneous exchange exception is to
encourage reluctant individuals and businesses to deal with financially
169. A comptroller in a small business facing financial difficulties many years ago related the
following story to me: she was receiving many phone calls from irate, unpaid creditors. One
particular creditor was verbally abusive toward her. She responded that she put all unpaid bills
into a bowl every Friday and then pulled out one bill to pay that week. As a consequence of his
abusive behavior, she said his bill would not even go into the bowl on Friday.
170. Section 101(31)(b) defines a corporate insider to include any officer, director, or their
relatives. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(b) (Supp. 2007).
171. § 547(b). A payment is preferential under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code if it involves
a transfer of the debtor's property on account of an antecedent debt made while the debtor was
insolvent during the applicable ninety day or one-year period. One element of a preference
requires that the payment be for an antecedent debt. Id. Because a check is "paid" when the
bank honors it, not when the debtor gives it to the creditor, salary checks given to executives will
routinely constitute payment for an antecedent debt. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393
(1992).
172. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2000) ("[N]o deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for appli-
cable employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the
amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds
$1,000,000."). But see § 162(m)(4)(C) (unless certain performance-based goals apply). See also
§ 280G (Golden Parachutes).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. 2007).
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troubled or insolvent businesses. Moreover, if the laws were other-
wise, no one could safely engage in financial transactions with any in-
solvent business or person without running the risk that even payment
immediately received for goods or services rendered to the debtor,
other than in cash, would have to be returned months later. Further,
the debtor's existing creditors are not thereby prejudiced, because the
debtor presumably received something of value in exchange for the
payment.
Next, affected executives may assert that their payouts constituted
payments in the ordinary course of business. 174 The ordinary course
of business defense has been widely criticized as an exception that
swallows up much of the rule and undercuts the key policies prefer-
ence law seeks to promote. 175 The ordinary course exception insulates
financial transactions that are routine from both the creditor's and the
debtor's perspectives. Although the case law tends to focus on pay-
ments to trade creditors, 76 an executive's wages paid on a regular ba-
sis, in exchange for that executive's services, might well qualify as
payments received during the ordinary course of business. 177
There is, more importantly, one additional hurdle to overcome in
order to apply preference law in the case of executive compensation:
it is unclear whether these transfers are "on account of an antecedent
debt. ' 178 Preference law focuses on existing creditors seeking to im-
prove their economic position at the expense of other creditors.
When a CEO signs an employment contract with the company, the
parties' contract is wholly executory on both sides.179 During each
pay period, however, the CEO and the company have exchanged la-
bor for services. The antecedent debt requirement necessary to con-
stitute a preference is missing, except perhaps from the final pay
period.' 80
174. § 547(c)(2).
175. See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 713, 817 (1985); Charles Jordon Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV 981, 986
(1992).
176. See, e.g., In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
late payments to sausage suppliers by pizza restaurant debtors are common in the pizza restau-
rant industry).
177. Cf In re Kumar Bavashi & Assocs., 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding a new value
exception, albeit with a two-to-one decision); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (Supp. 2007).
179. See generally Steven Kropp, A Case of Misplaced Priorities: A Proposed Solution To
Resolve The Apparent Conflict Between Sections 507 and 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1459 (1997); Kropp, supra note 52.
180. The Bankruptcy Code provides a fourth priority for workers' wages, in § 507, recently
raised to $10,000 and 180 days, from the prior version of the Code's third priority limits of $4,925
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Although the intricate requirements needed to constitute a voidable
preference under bankruptcy law may not exist, underlying preference
law policies suggest that an extension of the law is necessary. Apply-
ing the theory that one creditor should not be allowed to cut in line
ahead of other creditors, it seems that executives should not be al-
lowed to enjoy lavish compensation at the expense of displaced work-
ers headed for unemployment and lacking the safety net of a secure
pension fund. The Supreme Court emphasized the strong public poli-
cies that favor the protection of retirement funds in a trilogy of Chap-
ter 7 personal bankruptcy cases discussed below.
In Patterson v. Shumate, the plaintiff was one of over 400 employees
who participated in the employer's pension plan.1 81 When his em-
ployer went bankrupt in 1982, so did Shumate. 182 Patterson, Shu-
mate's bankruptcy trustee, sued to recover Shumate's pension money
still held by the pension plan, while Shumate sought to have the
money paid directly to him. Shumate argued that, under § 541(c)(2)
of the Code, property of the bankruptcy estate did not include the
debtor's beneficial interest in a trust restricted from involuntary trans-
fer under non-bankruptcy law. 183 The Supreme Court agreed, finding
that the statutory phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" included
federal laws such as ERISA, as well as state laws. 184 Accordingly, the
anti-alienation provision found in every ERISA-qualified plan consti-
tuted a restriction on transfer under non-bankruptcy law. 185 The
Court observed that its decision "[gave] full and appropriate effect to
ERISA's goal of protecting pension benefits . . . ensuring that 'if a
worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement
... he actually will receive it.' "186
More recently, in Yates v. Herdon, the Court expanded the defini-
tion of "employee" under ERISA by including a physician who owned
his practice. 187 The Court held that, so long as the physician and his
and three months. Under either version, the dollar and time limit impacts only senior manage-
ment. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (Supp. 2007).
181. 504 U.S. 753, 755 (1992).
182. Id. at 755.
183. Id. at 756.
184. Id. at 758.
185. Id. at 759.
186. Id. at 764-65 (citation omitted).
187. 541 U.S. 1 (2004). In 1989, Yates borrowed $20,000 at 11% interest from his pension
plan. Id. at 2. The loan required monthly payments over five years. Yates made no payments.
Id. In 1996, Yates repaid the pension plan over $50,000, representing principal and interest, a
few weeks before his creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. Id. The




spouse were not the only employee participants in the pension plan,
the physician, although a working owner, qualified as an employee. 88
The decision in Yates directly benefits working owners of small busi-
nesses and professional practices. This result also creates a strong in-
centive for owners to include their employees in pension plans. In
that sense, the Yates decision promotes the development of pensions
for ordinary workers.
Finally, in Rousey v. Jackoway,189 after Richard and Betty Jo
Rousey each lost their jobs, their employer-sponsored pension plan
required them to take a lump sum distribution, which the Rouseys
then deposited into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in each
of their names. 190 Several years later, they filed jointly for bank-
ruptcy. 191 Although they acknowledged that their IRAs constituted
property of the estate under § 541, they claimed that the IRAs were
exempt property under § 522(d). 192 The Court went beyond the for-
mal limitations of an ERISA-qualified retirement plan and protected
their individual IRA accounts. The Court's willingness to liberally in-
terpret the Code to protect IRAs during personal bankruptcy sup-
ports the argument that worker pensions deserve similar protection
during corporate bankruptcy. There is little value in according pen-
sions such a preferred place if the plans are easily wiped out during
corporate bankruptcy. 93
VIII. LEGISLATIVE REFORM EFFORTS
In the wake of the stock market collapse of 2001-2002, proposals to
curb abuse by senior executives, particularly CEOs and CFOs of pub-
licly traded companies, picked up steam. Congress adopted modest
reforms to correct abusive executive compensation practices as part of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX").194 First, SOX requires both
188. Id. at 2.
189. 544 U.S. 320 (2005).
190. Mr. Rousey was forced into early retirement at Northrop Gruman while Mrs. Rousey
was laid off from that same corporation. Brief for the Petitioners, No. 03-1407, 2004 WL
1900505, at *2 (Aug. 20, 2004).
191. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 322.
192. Id.
193. Congress indirectly signaled its approval of Rousey when it added §§ 512(n) and
522(d)(12) in 2005, permitting a debtor to exempt up to one million dollars in an IRA account.
11 U.S.C. §§ 512(n), 522(d)(12) (Supp. 2007).
194. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; 15 U.S.C. § 1743 (Supp. 2007). Compare Robert B. Ahdieh,
From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley,
53 BuFF. L. REV. 721, 722 (2005) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley "effectively captures the political
economy at work" and fairly referees "the familiar institutional competition between regulation
and the market"), with Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
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CEOs and CFOs to disgorge all bonuses, incentive-related compensa-
tion, and profits from the sale of stock received during the previous
twelve months if, as a result of misconduct, the company restates its
earnings because of material noncompliance with any financial report-
ing requirement. 195 Second, SOX bars publicly traded companies
from making unreasonably favorable loans to senior executives if the
terms were not available to other employees. 196 These restrictions ap-
ply outside of bankruptcy and, presumably, apply inside of bankruptcy
as well.
Efforts to further strengthen SOX's limitations on excessive execu-
tive compensation were less successful. Two senior members of the
Senate Banking Committee have each unsuccessfully authored a pro-
posal for broader reforms. Senator Dorgan attempted to amend SOX
to require that CEOs, CFOs, and directors pay all profits from the
sale of the company's securities in the twelve months preceding the
company's bankruptcy filing back to the company. 197 Senator Boxer
proposed amending SOX to require executives to forfeit all bonuses
and incentive-based compensation as well as all profits from the sale
of the company's securities earned in the twelve months requiring a
restatement of earnings. Forfeited funds would then be paid to for-
mer company employees whose job losses were caused by the need to
restate earnings. 198 These amendments were unsuccessful.
Senator Grassley, then Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, in-
troduced the Corporate Accountability in Bankruptcy Act in 2002.
The Bill would have permitted trustees to recover excessive compen-
sation from officers, directors, and other insiders paid by the bankrupt
corporation within one year of its bankruptcy filing. 199 The Bill would
have also extended the recovery period to the previous four years if a
corporate employee had engaged in securities or accounting
violations.
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2002) (concluding that
Sarbanes-Oxley is unneeded and costly: "Although markets will remain imperfect, the potential
for a market response, combined with the likely costs of regulation, make the case for additional
regulation dubious."). See also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (attacking Sarbanes-Oxley as a knee-
jerk political reaction prompted by a shift in public mood regarding big business and high profile
corporate scandals).
195. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304(a); 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (Supp. 2007).
196. Sarbanes-Oxley § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. 2007).
197. See S.A. 4214, 107th Cong. (2002). 148 CONG. REC. S6657-01 (daily ed. July 11, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Dorgan).
198. 148 CONG. REC. S6657-01 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
199. See S. 2901, 107th Cong. (2002).
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Most recently, Congressman Barney Frank introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives requiring that shareholders vote to approve
CEOs' compensation. 200 His bill initially garnered little support in the
Republican-led House. 20 1 Frank, who now serves as Chair of the
House Financial Services Committee, plans to reintroduce his Bill in
the 110th Congress where, at least in the House, it will stand a strong
chance of passage.20 2
IX. CONCLUSION
Workers bear the risk of corporate failure. These workers lose their
jobs and often their pensions. They are left to survive on unemploy-
ment insurance or welfare and are urged to undergo retraining to fit
into the new economy. 20 3 On the other hand, corporate executives
play by rules that guarantee no accountability for poor performance.
Rather, they ensure their economic situation through legally enforcea-
ble employment contracts with several favorable components: lucra-
tive stock options or outright grants of company stock for meeting
minimal performance targets; pension plans that are protected from
the risk of corporate bankruptcy; golden parachutes upon severance;
or bonuses for staying through a corporate reorganization. 20 4 Legisla-
tive reform is needed to level the playing field and, at the very least,
treat workers and executives under the same rules.
After a series of pension fund scandals, Congress enacted ERISA in
1974 to guarantee that a worker's vested interest in her company's
defined benefit pension plan would actually provide her a pension
when she eventually retired.20 5 Because corporations have increas-
ingly eschewed defined-benefit pension plans for 401(k) plans filled
with corporate stock, today's workers are again vulnerable to the risk
200. See H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005).
201. See Robert Schroeder, Executive Pay Returns to the Crosshairs, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 16,
2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com (enter the title into the search box, then follow
the link to the article) (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
202. Practically speaking, only members of Congress and CEOs set their own pay. At least
members of Congress face periodic elections. One virtue of Congressman Frank's proposed
legislation is that CEOs would meet the same test of approval or disapproval. Yet stockholders
may believe that a vote against CEO pay could harm the corporation or that it would be an
exercise in futility.
203. See John E. Silvia, Domestic Implications of a Global Labor Market, 41 Bus. ECON. 23
(2006); Ross Koppel & Alice Hoffman, Dislocation Policies in the U.S.A.: What Should We Be
Doing?, 544 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 111 (1996).
204. See Jessi D. Herman. Pay to Stay, Pay to Perform, or Pay to Go?: Construing the Thresh-
old Terms of§ 503(c)(1) and (2), 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 319 (2006).
205. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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that promised pensions will not materialize upon retirement. 206 The
prospect of senior executives forfeiting substantial sums of money in
the forms of salaries, bonuses, stock options, and pension funds will
give those executives strong incentive to cabin their greed and manage
the corporation with both eyes on the company's long-term prospects
instead of short-term gains.
In 2006, a dramatic, mid-term change in Congress produced a set of
elected officials who recognize that, over the last twenty-five years,
the United States has witnessed the growth of an unacceptable eco-
nomic chasm between the average American worker and the eco-
nomic elites.207 This Article contributes to the public and political
conversation surrounding the economic disparity between executives
and workers both inside and outside of bankruptcy. The next step is
to translate this conversation into concrete action.
206. Enron's 401(k) plan was a prime example. It provided employees with nearly twenty
different investment choices, but Enron's matching contribution of up to 6% was given only in
Enron stock, which employees were required to hold until age fifty. Prior to its collapse in 2001,
combining employee and employer contributions, nearly 60% of the employees' 401(k) funds
were held in Enron stock. See Stein, supra note 19, at 856-57.
207. See Webb, supra note 10.
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